Parcel, Postal and the Last Mile

Parcel delivery is the most visible part of the supply chain and the one whose economics are least understood by the people who use it. A parcel network is a machine of fixed costs — hubs, sort centres, aircraft, vans, drivers paid by the hour — that becomes profitable only when enough pieces flow through it, on enough routes, with enough pieces at each stop. Density is the product. The US market moved roughly 22–23 billion parcels a year in 2023–24 (Pitney Bowes Parcel Shipping Index, reported; the 2025 edition said growth slowed to ~0.4% year on year in Q1 2025 and forecast a most-likely ~30.5 billion by 2029). Its structure changed more in 2019–26 than in the previous forty years: Amazon Logistics built a private network that by the 2025 Pitney Bowes report had become the largest US parcel carrier by volume (~6.9 billion parcels, reported, 2024 data); FedEx ended its Amazon contracts in 2019 and merged Express and Ground into one network; UPS decided in 2025 to cut its Amazon volume roughly in half by mid-2026, closing dozens of buildings and cutting tens of thousands of jobs; and the US Postal Service — the carrier of last resort to every address — reported a net loss of ~$9.0bn in fiscal 2025 on ~$80.5bn of operating revenue and hit its $15bn Treasury borrowing limit (USPS, Nov 2025; congressional letter, Jun 2026). Europe ran a different experiment: lockers. Poland's InPost turned the parcel locker into a density machine, and in February 2026 a consortium of Advent and FedEx agreed to buy it for €15.60 a share (~€7.8bn). The quick-commerce boom of 2020–22 (Getir, Gorillas, Gopuff) showed the other side: speed bought with venture money and no density. This section explains how a parcel network makes money, the US share shifts, regional carriers and gig models, lockers, quick commerce, surcharges and returns. Two companion files work through a stylized route-density model and give a parcel-contract review checklist.