Supply chains are built for the average week and judged in the worst one. Since 2020 the worst weeks have come often. The Ever Given blocked the Suez Canal for six days (23–29 Mar 2021); the COVID goods boom left more than a hundred container ships waiting off Los Angeles and Long Beach at the peak in early 2022 (reported) and pushed the Drewry World Container Index composite to a record $10,377/FEU in Sep 2021 (Drewry, 16–23 Sep 2021); Houthi attacks from 19 Nov 2023 sent most container lines around the Cape of Good Hope, a diversion still only partly reversed at Nov 2026; drought cut Panama Canal transits in 2023–24; the Dali brought down Baltimore's Key Bridge on 26 Mar 2024, closing the port's channel until 10 Jun 2024; the East and Gulf Coast ports struck for three days (1–3 Oct 2024); and the 2026 Iran war effectively halted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz from early Mar 2026, with Brent above $115/bbl in March and a reported high of $126.41/bbl on 30 Apr 2026 (Energy 19). Container rates on the busiest US lane reflect the compound effect: Drewry WCI Shanghai–Los Angeles ~$7,514/FEU on 29 Oct 2026, against ~$2,290/FEU a year earlier (reported; verify). Cyberattacks — Maersk's NotPetya losses (Jun 2017; $200–300m estimated by the company in Aug 2017, later ~$250–300m, reported), Expeditors (Feb 2022) and Blue Yonder (Nov 2024) — showed that a disruption can start in software. This section explains the kinds of disruption, the chokepoints that matter, the major cases since 2011, how disruptions propagate, and how resilience is priced and bought. Two companion files tell the Red Sea and Key Bridge cases and work through what a second-port contract and a second supplier are worth to a stylized US importer.
What the study covers
- 1Overview: networks built for the average week
- 2Units and indicators
- 3A taxonomy of disruption
- 4The chokepoints
- 5Factories and nature: 2011 and after
- 6Cyber: when the chokepoint is software
- 7Ever Given (23–29 Mar 2021)
- 8COVID congestion and the 2021–22 boom
- 9The Red Sea (2023–26)
- 10Panama's drought (2023–24)
- 11Baltimore's Key Bridge (26 Mar 2024)
- 12Labour stoppages
- 13Hormuz (2026)
- 14How disruptions propagate — and who profits
- 15How resilience is priced
- 16Monitoring and early warning
- 17How to read disruption numbers
- 18Key numbers
- 19Landmark companies and cases
- 20Pitfalls
- 21How an expert thinks about it
- 22Glossary
Technical exhibits
Worked examples, checklists and case studies included with this study.
Red Sea Diversion and Key Bridge Case Studies
The Red Sea diversion at trade level (timeline, capacity absorbed, rates, Suez revenue, who gained and paid, why the return is stop-start) and the Key Bridge collapse (reopening, cargo diversions, the $2.25bn Maryland settlement, the $4.3–5.2bn rebuild)
Resilience Option Value Second Port and Dual Sourcing Worked Example
A stylized US importer weighing a standing second-port routing contract and a 30% second supplier: loss per event, expected annual loss, break-even probabilities and premiums, and a 200,000-year simulation of tail losses (computed in Python)
Companies in this study
- A.P. Moller-Maersk
- Mediterranean Shipping Company
- CMA CGM
- Hapag-Lloyd
- Evergreen Marine
- ZIM
- Matson
- Suez Canal Authority
- Panama Canal Authority
- DP World
- CSX
- Canadian Pacific Kansas City
- FedEx
- Expeditors International
- Flexport
- Blue Yonder
- Kinaxis
- project44
- Toyota
- Dell Technologies
- Apple Supply Chain
- Walmart
- Home Depot
- Costco
- Target
- IKEA. For Hormuz, oil and LNG shipping see Energy 19 Geopolitics; for critical-mineral export controls see Energy 20 Critical Minerals; for chip export controls and Taiwan risk see AI 20 Geopolitics and Export Controls.