Energy · Profile from Energy Research Companion
Gazprom
Russia's state-controlled gas monopoly, created in August 1989 from the Soviet Ministry of the Gas Industry, which for three decades sold pipeline gas to Europe under long-term, oil-indexed contracts and was the largest single supplier of Europe's gas — ~150 bcm of pipeline exports in 2021 and ~40% of EU gas imports (reported, figures vary by source). It used price and transit disputes as leverage over Ukraine (2006, 2009), built routes around Ukraine (Nord Stream 1 in 2011, TurkStream in 2020, Nord Stream 2 finished in 2021 but never certified), and opened a second front to China (Power of Siberia 1, December 2019). In 2022, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom cut supplies to Europe step by step; Nord Stream 1 stopped on 31 August and three of the four Nord Stream strings were destroyed by explosions on 26 September 2022. Its European pipeline sales fell to ~25 bcm in 2023 and ~18 bcm in 2025 (Reuters estimate), and it reported a 2023 net loss, its first in over two decades. In 2025 it sold more gas to China (38.8 bcm, company) than to Europe for the first time. It is the clearest case in this book of a route to market destroyed by its owner's politics.
At a glance
- Founded
- State Gas Concern Gazprom, August 1989, from the USSR Ministry of the Gas Industry (minister Viktor Chernomyrdin); Russian joint-stock company RAO Gazprom by presidential decree (November 1992, registered February 1993); PJSC Gazprom
- Headquarters
- St Petersburg (Lakhta Centre; legal registration moved from Moscow in 2021, reported); large Moscow offices remain
- Ownership / structure
- State-controlled: the Russian Federation holds just over 50% directly and through Rosneftegaz and Rosgazifikatsiya (reported). Listed on the Moscow Exchange; its London and US depositary receipt programmes were suspended in March 2022 and terminated under a Russian law of April 2022 (reported)
- Leadership (2026)
- Alexei Miller (Chairman of the Management Committee, i.e. CEO, since May 2001); Viktor Zubkov (chair of the board of directors since 2008, verify 2026)
- Segments
- Gas production (Yamal, Nadym-Pur-Taz, Eastern Siberia: Chayanda, Kovykta); gas transmission (the Unified Gas Supply System, ~180,000 km of trunk pipelines, company claim); exports (Gazprom Export, the legal monopoly on Russian pipeline-gas exports since 2006); domestic gas sales at regulated prices; oil (Gazprom Neft, ~96%); power and heat (Gazprom Energoholding); LNG (Sakhalin-2 majority, Portovaya; Baltic LNG with RusGazDobycha, verify); refining and gas processing (Amur GPP, Astrakhan, Orenburg)
- Scale
- Gas production ~515 bcm (2021) → ~413 bcm (2022) → ~359 bcm (2023) → ~416 bcm (2024) (company, reported; verify 2024–25). 2025 IFRS revenue ~RUB 9.77tn, EBITDA ~RUB 2.92tn, net profit attributable ~RUB 1.31tn (+7%) (company via TASS, 30 Apr 2026). Gas reserves (Russian A+B1+C1 classification, not SEC or PRMS) ~35 tcm, company claim (verify)
- Debt
- Total debt ~RUB 6.74tn at end-2025; net debt/EBITDA ~2.07x (end-2025) against ~1.83x (end-2024) (company via TASS). No dividend paid for 2023, 2024 or 2025 (reported)
- Signature moves (incl. failures)
- Formation from the Soviet gas ministry (1989–93); the Ukraine cut-offs (2006, 2009); Nord Stream 1 (2011); Power of Siberia 1 (2019); Nord Stream 2 and US sanctions (2019–22); the 2022 cuts to Europe; the Nord Stream explosions (26 Sep 2022); the 2023 loss; the end of Ukrainian transit and Power of Siberia 2 (2025–26)
9 strategic moves analysed
Each one gets a full strategy file in the companion: context, the decision, the financing, what happened, and the lesson.
1989
Formation from the Soviet Gas Ministry
Founding (corporatisation of a ministry), then partial privatisation
2006
and 2009 Ukraine Cut Offs
Offtake or supply contract dispute used as leverage (supply cut-off)
2011
Nord Stream 1
Construction or commissioning (offshore export pipeline)
2019
Power of Siberia 1
Offtake or supply contract (30-year sales contract) and construction or commissioning (export pipeline and fields)
2021
Nord Stream 2 and US Sanctions
Project final investment decision and construction; sanctions (US) and regulatory action (Germany)
2022
Cuts to Europe
Strategy pivot (supply cut-off as state policy) — failure
2022
Nord Stream Explosions
Accident or disaster (sabotage of export infrastructure)
2023
First Annual Loss in Decades
Restructuring (financial result of the loss of Europe) — failure
2025
Ukraine Transit End and Power of Siberia 2
Offtake or supply contract (loss of the Ukrainian route; memorandum on a new Chinese route)